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Divided Justice: A Commentary on the
Nomination and Confirmation of
Justice Thomas

Michael J. Gerhardt*

"The fault ... is not in our stars, [b]ut in ourselves[.]"
William Shakespeare 1

Introduction
For roughly two hundred years, politics has influenced dramatically the nomination and confirmation of Supreme Court justices.
Presidents routinely have selected nominees to the Court based on
political considerations, 2 and senatorial advice and consent remains
the only political check in the process of selecting Supreme Court
justices.3 Even so, the racial and sexual politics underlying muchbut not all-of the controversy over the appointment of Clarence
Thomas as an associate justice of the United States Supreme Court
shocked most observers,4 prompting widespread condemnation of

* Associate Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, The College of William
and Mary. B.A. 1978, Yale University; M.Sc. 1979, London School of Economics; J.D.
1982, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Erwin Chemerinsky, Dave Douglas, Tracey
Maclin, Paul Marcus, Nancy-Ann Min, Glenn Reynolds, Steve Wermeil, and Ron Wright
for their generous comments on earlier drafts; and to Tim Hui and Eric Hurt for their
excellent research assistance.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, jULIUS CAESAR act 1, SC. 2, ll. 140-41 (Arthur Humphries
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1984).
2. See infra note 27 and accompanying text; cJ. infra note 25 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 25, 27-31 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Leslie Phillips, Marching in Protest; 7 Tr)' to Crash Senate, USA ToDAY, Oct.
,
9, 1991, at 3A.
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the Thomas confirmation hearings and proposals to change the system for nominating and confirming Supreme Courtjustices. 5
This Essay argues that the existing process for the nomination
and confirmation of Supreme Court justices is sound, but that it
failed with respect to Justice Thomas because many of the decisionmakers did not strive to ensure the appointment of a justice
with the appropriate professional credentials, integrity, judicial temperament and philosophy, and grounding in constitutional law.
Political choices and differences rather than procedural defects explain any missteps injustice Thomas' nomination and confirmation.
The outcome turned in large part on deep-seated divisions among
the American people and their leaders over racial equality, the relevance of race and sexually related conduct to the evaluation of
Supreme Court nominees, and the applicable burden of persuasion
in the Senate's confirmation proceedings. These divisions crippled
the confirmation hearings on justice Thomas, paralyzing much fruitful discussion in the Senate on his qualifications to be an associate
justice, and culminating in the most closely divided vote ever in
favor of the confirmation of a Supreme Court justice. 6
Part I identifies the common elements of those moments when the
nomination and confirmation process has worked most effectively.
At its best, the process has enabled the President and the Senate to
push each other to consider seriously the nominee's professional accomplishments, judicial temperament and philosophy, intellectual
integrity, and ability to bring ideological balance or diversity to the
Court. At its worst, the process has failed to prevent the President,
the Senate, or both, from caring primarily about the immediate
political gains of an appointment, and thus from being indifferent or
even consciously opposed to considering any of the factors truly relevant to selecting competent jurists.
Part II criticizes President Bush, Justice Thomas, and many senators for their performances in the nomination and confirmation of
Justice Thomas, and particularly for allowing Justice Thomas' race
and background to tum the focus of the process away from the factors that appropriately identify those meriting a seat on the
5. See, e.g., Ann Devroy, Bush Launches Strike at Congress: President Calls Lawmakers
'Privileged Class of Rulers', WASH. PosT, Oct. 25, 1991, at A1; David Lauter & Ronald].
Ostrow, Ways Sought to Improve Confinnation Proceedings, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1991, at A1;
Anthony Lewis, Lessons of Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1991, at A17; Robert F. Nagel,
No Show Show: Refonn the Hearings, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 1991, at 20; David E. Rosenbaum, The Thomas Confirmation: Selection Process Under Attack on All Sides, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
17, 1991, at A22; see also Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Advice Seriously: An Immodest Proposal
for Reforming the Confirmation Process, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1577 (1992) ("If we are to give
effect to the advice provision, then, we must create a system that grants the Senate an
institutional role in the selection of nominees, but one that does not bind the President's
hands.").
6. The Senate confirmed Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court by a 52-48 vote.
137 CoNG. REc. Sl4,704-05 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991). The only other favorable confirmation vote that comes as close is the Senate's 26-23 vote in 1857 to confirm Nathan
Clifford, President Polk's Attorney General and an ardent defender of slavery. See LAuRENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF SUPREME
CouRT jusTICES SHAPES OuR HISTORY 88 (1985).
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Supreme Court. This Part condemns (1) the President's purely partisan decision to nominate Justice Thomas because of the latter's
race and ideology, (2) Justice Thomas' reliance on his handlers'
"Pin Point Strategy" 7 rather than his professional record in the
hearings, and (3) the Senate's general failure to seize on the appropriate issues-competency and credibility-for evaluating Justice
Thomas.
Part III suggests that, although no proposal for modifying the
nomination and confirmation process can protect the nation from
errors in human judgment, some minor changes can prevent divided government from obstructing the appointment of qualified
persons, and make it easier for the participants to focus on something more noble than the petty political concerns of the moment.
This Part proposes that the public and the Senate should pressure
the President to take more seriously his own public rhetoric about
nominating qualified people for the Court in spite of any ideological
baggage they may carry. This Part further proposes that the Senate
should (1) focus primarily on the nominee's full public record, (2)
follow the lead of senators such as Albert Gore and Paul Simon, who
suggested putting the burden of persuasion on the President, his
nominee, or both, (3) steadfastly oppose any nominee whose ideology the Senate opposes or whose level of professional experience it
finds wanting, and {4) schedule hearings shortly after the President
selects his nominee in order to prevent the nominee from being indoctrinated by his handlers.

I.

The Lessons of History: A Brief Overoiew of the Nomination and
Confirmation Process

To provide some perspective on the battle over Justice Clarence
Thomas' appointment to the Supreme Court, it is useful to consider
what generally distinguishes successes from failures in the nomination and confirmation process. The obvious starting point for such
analysis is the Appointments Clause, which provides that the President "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court." 8 This Clause reflects the
framers' intent that the politically accountable branches of the federal government-the President and the Senate-each perform serious roles in determining the composition of the third branch.
7. Richard L. Berke, The Thomas Hearings: In Thomas' Hearing Room, Spirits of Hearings Past, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at A25 (describing justice Thomas' handlers' "Pin
Point Strategy," which required justice Thomas to remind the senators on the judiciary
Committee whenever possible about his difficult childhood and upbringing in Pin Point,
Georgia, in order to keep them from focusing the hearings on his professional record).
8. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
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Although the President and the Senate invariably consider the political ramifications of their decisions regarding appointments,9 the
history of the nomination and confirmation process shows significant moments in which the President and the Senate have pushed
each other to look past the immediate-often petty-political gains
of a Supreme Court appointment for the sake of promoting certain
political ideals, particularly with respect to the improvement, balance, and quality of the third branch.
At its best, the process has enabled the President and the Senate
to cooperate in making considered judgments on the Supreme
Court nominee's professional experience, judicial temperament and
philosophy, intellectual integrity, and capacity to provide ideological diversity or balance on the Supreme Court. 10 Although these
9. See infra note 26 and accompanying text; see also Calvin R. Massey, Getting There:
A Brief History of the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments, 19 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q, 1, 1
(1990) (analyzing the history of Supreme Court appointments in terms of "failed nominations," "controversial but successful nominations," "instances in which the President
nominated the Senate's choice," and "instances in which the President has let the Court
(or an individual justice) dictate the choice").
10. No consensus exists in favor of these factors. Some people might even vehemently oppose them, especially those who believe appointing justices who share a specific ideology is in the Court's, Constitution's, and nation's best interests. I stand by
these factors, however, because I believe they do not give an undue advantage to any
reasonable view of constitutional interpretation and because they comport with what I
regard as the essential judicial function, which is to mediate between competing constitutional visions. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, 75 CoRNELL L. REV. 1358,
1390-92 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw (1989)) [hereinafter Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork]; Michael].
Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 68, 140-47 (1991) [hereinafter Gerhardt, Role of Precedent]. Many who favor appointing only justices who share a particular ideology may do so because they believe
that there is a single correct answer to every interpretive question about the Constitution, and that their particular ideology is the inexorable guide to those answers or results. Although I believe that some seminal cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), can be defended in terms of a variety ofrespectablejudicial ideologies, I suspect most Americans share the view that the Court is at its best when it (1)
concedes that cases must be judged on their facts and that no single theory of constitutional interpretation can explain all of constitutional law, and (2) fosters an open dialogue on constitutional issues. See generally HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE
CoNSTITUTION 158 (1990) ("For what the Court decides is both derived from public
values and in tum shapes public values. It is this interaction-this complex and robust
dialogue-that ultimately makes final the meaning of our fundamental law."); Richard A.
Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1371 (1990) ("[T]he Court's survival
and flourishing are indeed more likely to depend on the political accountability of its
results than on its adherence to an esoteric philosophy of interpretation.").
For examples of other scholars' criteria for evaluating nominees, see TRIBE, supra note
6, at 94, 96, 106-07 (suggesting that, beyond determining a nominee's basic competency
to sit on the Court, senators should determine whether the nominee's "vision of what
the Constitution means" comes within the bounds of the "American vision" (emphasis
omitted) and whether the nominee's appointment "would upset the Court's equilibrium
or exacerbate what [they regard] as an already excessive conservative or liberal bias");
Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE
LJ. 657, 657 (1970) (maintaining that a senator should vote against confirmation if he
or she "firmly believes, on reasonable grounds, that the nominee's views on the large
issues of the day will make it harmful to the country for him [or her] to sit and vote on
the Court"); Henry P. Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 1202, 1207 (1988) (proposing that senators should feel free to vote against a
Supreme Court nominee based on "statesmanship, prudence, common sense, and politics"); William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court
Appointment Process, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 633, 681 (1987) (arguing that a senator
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factors may not be perfectly neutral, they generally have played to
the advantage of both political parties over the years and have fostered the appointment of distinguished Supreme Court justices with
varied backgrounds and respectable constitutional visions.
For the sake of brevity, I offer only a few examples in which presidents, senators, or both, have based their respective nomination and
confirmation decisions on some or all of the above factors. Perhaps
the most famous example is Republican President Hoover's nomination of Benjamin Cardozo, who at the time of his appointment
was the revered chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals. 11
AlthoughJustice Cardozo was a Democrat, and would have been the
third New Yorker and the second Jew on the Supreme Court, the
Senate, numerous distinguished academics, and labor leaders demanded that President Hoover nominate Justice Cardozo because
they believed the times warranted the kind of intellectual distinction
and balance he could bring to the Court.l2
Similarly, President Eisenhower-a Republican-nominated as
associate justice the highly regarded New Jersey Supreme Court Justice William Brennan-a Democrat-to show the President's willingness to add political diversity to the Court. 13 Two of President
Eisenhower's other appointments to the Supreme Court, Justices
John Harlan and Potter Stewart, although both solid Republicans,
were overwhelmingly confirmed by the Democrat-controlled Senate-despite some staunch opposition from southern segregationists-because each had demonstrated first-rate legal minds,
intellectual integrity, and even judicial temperaments. Justice
Harlan had practiced law for over twenty-five years and served
briefly as a judge on the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. 14
Justice Stewart had received widespread praise for his judicial restraint, acumen, and independence during his four years as a judge
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 15 Similarly, although ideology, heritage, or friendship obviously mattered
in the nominations of Justices Louis Brandeis, 16 Harlan Fiske
should vote against confirmation of any nominee "whose fundamental judicial or political values differ from those of the senator"); Gary J. Simson, Taking the Court Seriously: A
Proposed Approach to Senate Conjinnation of Supreme Court Nominees, 7 CoNST. COMMENTARY
283, 289 (1990) (suggesting that each senator should consider a nominee's positions
with regard to "[t]he outcome of cases of major national significance[, p]ublic confidence in the Supreme Court[, and t]he fairness and efficiency of the Supreme Court's
decisionmaking process").
11. See HENRY j. ABRAHAM, jUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 204-07 (3d ed. 1992); Massey, supra note 9, at 1112.
12. ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 204-07; Massey, supra note 9, at 11-12.
13. ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 265-67; TRIBE, supra note 6, at 52.
14. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 262-65.
15. !d. at 271-75.
16. Jd. at 180-84; see also ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 466
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Stone, 17 Felix Frankfurter, 1s Abe Fortas, 19 and Thurgood Marshall, 20 they each had, at the time of their respective appointments,
virtually unparalled professional accomplishments. 21
Among the more recent appointments, Justices John Paul Stevens, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter were highly regarded
lawyers andjudges at the time of their nominations. Justice Stevens
graduated first in his college and law school classes, and was a nationally renowned antitrust lawyer and independent judge for five
years on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.22 Justice Kennedy served with distinction as a federal court of
appeals judge for over twelve years; 23 and Justice Souter had received widespread praise as a state attorney general, trial court
judge, and supreme courtjustice in New Hampshire. 24 Justices Stevens', Kennedy's, and Souter's public records merited and received
(1946) (discussing President Wilson's esteem for Justice Brandeis on a persona1level);
MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A MIND OF ONE PIECE: BRANDEIS AND AMERICAN REFORM 119-25
(1971) (discussing President Wilson's respect for and frequent reliance on the advice of
Justice Brandeis prior to his nomination).
17. See ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAw 181-85 (1956)
("[President] Coolidge's decision to appoint Stone was prompted by ... his record[,] ...
independence[,] ... his political services, ... and personal friendship.").
18. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 220-25; TRIBE, supra note 6, at 84-85.
19. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 288-90; see also LAURA KALMAN, ABE FoRTAS: A
BIOGRAPHY 241-48 (1990) (discussing President Johnson's friendship with and respect
for Justice Fortas prior to his nomination).
20. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 292-94; see also infra note 137 and accompanying
text.
21. Justice Brandeis graduated first in his Harvard Law School class and practiced
law for over forty years in Boston. During this time, he devoted himself to numerous
public causes including, but not limited to, his arbitration of labor disputes in New
York's garment industry, and arguments before the Court in support of the constitutionality of state maximum hour and minimum wage statutes. See UROFSKY, supra note 16;
MASON, supra note 16. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone practiced law for twenty-five years with
a Wall Street law firm. He then served, in succession, as a professor at and Dean of the
Columbia Law School, Attorney General of the United States, associate justice of the
Supreme Court, and finally chief justice. See MAsoN, supra note 17, at 77-181. Prior to
his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Frankfurter was a distinguished professor of constitutional, administrative, and labor law at Harvard Law School; helped found
The New Republic; and served in a variety of public positions and as an informal advisor to
President Roosevelt in formulating the New Deal. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 22025; TRIBE, supra note 6, at 84-85. Justice Fortas was editor of the Yale Law Journal,
served as an advisor to various Democratic politicians, founded the prestigious Washington, D.C. law firm of Arnold, Fortas, and Porter, defended many victims of McCarthyism, and litigated several major civil rights cases, including Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 288-90; KALMAN, supra
note 19. After graduating at the top of his class from Howard Law School, Justice Marshall served for over two decades as General Counsel to the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People. During this time he won several landmark civil rights
cases in the Supreme Court, including Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954); was appointed by President Kennedy to sit on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; and was appointed United States Solicitor General by President Johnson. Justice Marshall won twenty-nine of the thirty-two cases he argued
before the Supreme Court. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 292-94; see also infra note 137
and accompanying text.
22. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 327-31; TRIBE, supra note 6, at 108.
23. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 359.
24. See, e.g., Paul R. Baier, The Court and Its Critics, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1992, at 60-61
(refuting Bruce Fein's criticism of the professional abilities of recent Court appointments including Justices Kennedy and Souter); Richard L. Berke, Senate Conjinns Souter,
90 to 9, As Supreme Court's /05thjustice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1990, at A1 (referring to
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strong bipartisan support in the Senate, which was controlled by the
Democrats at the time each was nominated.
There also have been times when the Senate has focused as much
on the net impact of adding the candidate to the Court as on the
opinions of the nominee himself. In this century, the Senate rejected President Hoover's nomination of the concededly competent
Judge John Parker of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit because it did not want to add another vote to the
Court's conservative, antilabor majority. 25 More recently, in one of
the most widely publicized nomination hearings in American history, the Senate rejected Robert Bork, despite his distinguished professional background, because it found that many of his views on
constitutional issues threatened well-settled American constitutional
jurisprudence and because it feared he would tip the Court's ideological balance too far to the right. 26
At other times, though, presidents and senators have made petty
political judgments during the Supreme Court appointment process.27 Indeed, the first Senate rejected for the position of chiefjustice President Washington's nomination of Associate Justice John
Rutledge-a delegate to the constitutional convention-based on its
disagreement with Justice Rutledge's views on the United States'
treaty with Great Britain. 28 In this century, the Senate confirmed
Justice Brandeis in 1916, but only after four months of Senate debate marred by antisemitism and accusations that Justice Brandeis
was radical, anti-establishment, and anti-big-business. 29 In 1967,
Judiciary Chairman Biden's statement regarding "the strong bi-partisan support" for
Justice Souter).
25. The Senate focused on judge Parker's adherence to a Supreme Court precedent
upholding contracts that conditioned employment on not joining a labor union. See
ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 42-43, 200; TRIBE, supra note 6, at 34, 90-91; Massey, supra
note 9, at 6.
26. See Massey, supra note 9, at 6-7; Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, supra note 10, at
1386-90.
27. Some of those nominated to the Supreme Court for political and even ideological reasons also had diverse and distinguished professional experience, and became intellectual leaders or coalition builders for the betterment of constitutional doctrine on
the Court. Perhaps the most prominent example is President Eisenhower's nomination
of Earl Warren to Chief Justice to reward the latter's support at the 1952 Republican
Convention. See BERNARD ScHWARTZ, SuPER CHIEF, at 2 (1983); G. EDWARD WHITE,
EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 138-40 (1982). Other examples of such appointments
include Justices Hugo Black, see GERALD T. DuNNE, HuGo BLACK AND THE juDICIAL
REVOLUTION 43-48 (1977), Robert jackson, see EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADvoCATE: RoBERT H. jACKSON 229-32 (1958), and Lewis Powell, see ABRAHAM, supra note 11,
311-18. For a discussion of these and other politically motivated appointments to the
Court, see, for example, ABRAHAM, supra note 11; TRIBE, supra note 6, at 50-76.
28. For a discussion of the reasons for the Senate's rejections of Justice Rutledge
and other nominees throughout the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth century, see ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 71-207; TRIBE, supra note 6, at 77-92; Massey, supra note 9, at 5.
29. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 180-184; TRIBE, supra note 6, at 91.
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the Senate confirmedJustice Marshall despite strong objections on
philosophical and overtly racist grounds. 30 In 1973, President Richard Nixon, frustrated over the Senate's rejection of the distinguished Fourth Circuit Judge Clement Haynesworth based on
claims of ethical impropriety and insensitivity to racism, 31 nominated the lackluster Judge Harold Carswell of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 3 2 The Senate wasted little
time in rejecting Judge Carswell for not being sufficiently
competent. 33
In the final analysis, the Appointments Clause of the Constitution
challenges the President and the Senate to put petty political concerns aside to make deliberate and respectable judgments as to
whether particular appointments are in the nation's, the Court's,
and the Constitution's best long-term interests. The history of the
nomination and confirmation process suggests that sometimes the
responsible political actors meet this challenge, and sometimes they
do not. Part II suggests that the nomination and confirmation of
Justice Clarence Thomas ranks more toward the merely political
rather than the nobler end of the spectrum of the Supreme Court
confirmation process.

II.

A Case Study: The Ups and Downs of the Thomas Nomination
and Confirmation

This Part examines the respective political judgments of President
Bush, the Senate, and Justice Thomas himself, as major participants
in the nomination and confirmation of Clarence Thomas. It maintains that, for the most part, they each failed in their respective roles
to ensure the appointment of a Supreme Court justice with the appropriate professional credentials, intellectual integrity, judicial
temperament and philosophy, and ability to maintain intellectual
distinction or balance on the Court.
A.

The Thomas Nomination: President Bush's Racial Politics Meet the
Supreme Court

When President Bush nominated Clarence Thomas to fill the vacancy on the Court created by Justice Marshall's resignation, no one
took seriously the President's characterization ofJustice Thomas as
"the best person" in the country to serve on the Court. 34 Justice
Thomas had limited professional distinction, with his most significant legal experiences having been a controversial tenure as chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and barely
more than one year of experience as a federal court of appeals
30. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 292-95.
31. See TRIBE, supra note 6, at 82, 88-89.
32. See id.; Massey, supra note 9, at 7.
33. See TRIBE, supra note 6, at 82, 88-89; Massey, supra note 9, at 7-8.
34. John E. Yang & Sharon LaFraniere, Bush Picks Thomas for Supreme Court,
PosT, july 2, 1991, at AI.
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judge. At forty-three, Justice Thomas was a controversial conservative who happened to be ajudge rather than a distinguished judgesuch as Anthony Kennedy or David Souter-who also happened to
be a conservative.
Justice Thomas' race and ideology accounted for his nomination.
In nominating Justice Thomas, the President dared the Senate to
reject an African-American who combined an "up-by-the-bootstraps" life story35 with Judge Robert Bork's flare for alienating liberal interest groups and assailing popular or well-established,
rights-granting Supreme Court opinions. Justice Thomas' nomination was a bold political move calculated to make it more difficult for
many of the same civil rights organizations and southern blacks,
who opposed Judge Bork's nomination, to oppose Justice
Thomas. 36 In addition, Justice Thomas' nomination was designed
in part to remove political heat from the President's opposition to
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,37 which continued even in the midst of
the Thomas confirmation hearings. 38 The Thomas nomination reflected President Bush's general political approach to civil rights:
The President hoped to mollify many whites dissatisfied with affirmative action through his opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1991,39
but he also hoped to attract more blacks to the Republican party
through his appointment of Justice Thomas. Thus, it was Justice
Thomas' race and ideology, and not his professional credentials,
that made him uniquely qualified to merit President Bush's nomination to the Court.4o
In selecting Justice Thomas, President Bush returned to a practice-nominating extreme ideologues for the Supreme Court-that
many hoped had ended with the Senate's rejection of Judge Bork.
At the same time, President Bush was following President Reagan's
lead by relying on a small cadre of advisors to facilitate the selection
35. Linda Greenhouse, Who'sjudge Thomas? For Now, It Depends on Who You Are, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1991, § 4, at 4.
36. See Erwin Chemerinsky, October Tragedy, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1497 (1992).
37. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 became law on November 21, 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)).
38. See, e.g., Adam Clymer, White House Rejects New Compromise on Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 1991, at A16.
39. The President opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 because he believed it
would lead to the implementation of racial quotas in hiring. See Adam Clymer, Senate
Democrats Back a Compromise on Civil Rights Bil~ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1991, at AI.
40. Cf. Reginald Alleyne, Think of the Outcry If This Nominee Were White, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1991, at B7 (suggesting that "a white nominee with a record like Thomas'
would have a very difficult time winning Senate confirmation" and that a rejection of
Judge Thomas would have left the Court "without a black member, because President
Bush's nomination of another black would destroy his already ludicrous attempt to portray the nomination of Thoma$ as one having nothing to do with race. Also, Thomas
may actually be the only prominently placed black in the United States whose views on
legal issues of race would be acceptable to the Bush Administration").
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of federal judges with conservative views far to the right of the
judges that Republican Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford had
tended to appoint. 41 For the most part, Reagan and Bush judges
are disposed to agree on a strong libertarian distrust of federal
power, as well as on confining the scope of-particularly federalstatutes to their literal language, opposing federal court interference with state legislation on the basis of unenumerated fundamental rights, allowing more religion in public life, giving little
deference to precedents that do not conform to their ideologies, deferring to the executive in separation of powers disputes, supporting the death penalty, rejecting or discounting claims of
constitutional violations in criminal convictions, and sometimes recognizing economic liberties enforceable against federal and state
governments.42
To understand how important ideology rather than experience or
competency is to the President's choice of federal judges, particularly in the lower courts, one need look no further than the President's choice to replace Justice Thomas on the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, John Roberts. 43 Rather
than choose from among numerous conservative and moderate
Republicans with substantially more legal or judicial experience,44
the President nominated Roberts, a thirty-seven-year-old white male
with modest legal experience, consisting of a prestigious law school
record, judicial clerkships, a few years in a big firm practice, a short
stint as Deputy Solicitor General, and, perhaps most notably, "important relationships with influential Bush administration officials,
especially among the corps of youthful GOP lawyers who are wielding increasing influence in the federal government." 45 Even though
41. See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind ofjudges Reagan Favored, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
IO, 1990, at AI; Amy Singer, A Federalist in the White House, AM. LAw., Oct. I99I, at 87.
42. See Guido Calabresi, What Clarence Thomas Knows, N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, I99I, § 4,
at I5 (denouncing the current majority's "aggressive, willful, statist" behavior); Earl
Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative Activism in Constitutional jurisprudence, 24 GA.
L. REv. 629 ( I990) (describing the strands of conservatism reflected in contemporary
constitutional theory and decisionmaking); cf. Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bark-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L.
REv. 80, 83, I51 (I99I) [hereinafter Calabresi, What the Bark-Brennan Debate Ignores]
(describing the Reagan and Bush appointees as having "an activist outlook" and as
"generally supporting state power and eroding libertarian values"). The nomination of
judges and justices with such ideologies contrasts sharply with President Jimmy Carter's
system for merit selection of federal judges. See Charles R. Babcock, Picking Federal
judges: Merit System vs. Pork Bench, WASH. PosT, Nov. 7, I978, at A4 (describing President
Carter's plan to establish a merit selection system for selecting federal judges, including
the establishment of special judicial selection commissions appointed by the President);
Stuart A. Taylor, Jr., Carter judge Selections Praised, but Critics Discern Partisanship, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1980, at AI (describing President Carter's merit selection system as partially succeeding in removing partisanship in the nomination of federal judges).
43. See Daniel Klaidman, Bush Chooses Deputy SG for D.C. Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, Dec.
16, 199I, at 1.
44. Id. (indicating Bush passed over "better-known and more seasoned contenders,
including Judge Michael Boudin of the [United States] District Court for the District of
Columbia and Stuart Gerson, assistant attorney general for the Justice Department's
Civil Division").
45. Id. at 17; see also Saundra Torry, D.C. Lawyer May Be Named to Fill Thomas' Seat,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 2I, I991, at A5.
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Roberts will be younger than a substantial majority of lawyers practicing before him, his appointment serves the goal of packing the
judiciary with ideologues, preferably young, who have had little experience to inform their judgment.46 Justice Thomas also fits this
mold, being younger than many of the distinguished lawyers appearing before him and expecting to serve far longer on the Court
than he spent in training to get there.
The tragic effect of President Bush's apparent attitude aboutjudicial nominations is that this is the longest period in American history in which one political party has without interruption made
appointments to the Supreme Court.47 President Bush and his
small cadre of advisors has helped to solidify the most ideologically
unbalanced Court-as well as the most hostile to civil rights-since
the Fuller Court, which decided Plessy v. Ferguson 4 8 in 1896.49 The
degree to which Justice Thomas fulfills White House plans to overhaul the federal courts becomes even clearer in the next subpart,
which examines Justice Thomas' performance during his confirmation hearings.
B.

Clarence Thomas: The Divided justice

Essentially, Justice Thomas' confirmation hearings consisted of
two phases, the first of which focused on his views on constitutional
issues (Phase I) and the second of which dealt with Professor Anita
Hill's charges of sexua1 harassment (Phase II). Before, during, and
after the confirmation proceedings, more than one image ofJustice
Thomas appeared in the public eye. It remains to be seen which of
these personas will emerge as an associate justice of the United
States Supreme Court.
Prior to his nomination to the Court, Clarence Thomas appeared
to be a man at war with himself and his heritage. While he admitted
to having benefited from affirmative action programs at Yale Law
46. Yet another example is the recent appointment ofJudgeJ. Michael Luttig, age:
thirty-seven, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See Saundra
Torry, Some judges Decide a Lifetime on the Federal Bench Is Too Long, WASH. PosT, Jan. 20,
1992, at F5. Shortly after being confirmed by the Senate, Judge Luttig received widespread criticism for continuing to work as an advisor to Justice Thomas in the latter's
confirmation hearings in spite of the Code ofJudicial Conduct for United States Judges,
which "discourages judges from engaging in 'political activity' and from any conduct
that appears to compromise their independence or impartiality." Robb London, A Question of Ethics for a New judge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, at B16.
47. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at app. D.
48. 163 u.s. 537 (1896).
49. See Calabresi, What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores, supra note 42, at 83, 151; A.
Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal judicial
Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005, 1027 (1992) (urging Justice Thomas not to aid the
Court in its continuing "retreat from protecting the rights of the poor, women, the disadvant~ged, minorities, and the powerless") (footnote omitted).
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School, 50 he characterized such programs as "offensive."5 1 In addition, despite often claiming that he had not sought civil rights-related jobs because he believed others saw them as the only legal
work appropriate for African-Americans, he eventually turned down
an opportunity to work in the White House on energy and environmental issues and instead agreed to serve as Assistant Secretary for
Civil Rights in the Department of Education, and later as Chairman
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 52 Regrettably, none of these positions, even combined with his experience for little more than a year as a federal appellate judge, required
Thomas to spend much meaningful time doing the kind of work expected of Supreme Court justices, including critiquing and crafting
legal decisions and arguments.
During the hearings, Justice Thomas consciously cast himself as
someone other than the often strident and controversial government figure he had been in the Reagan and Bush administrations.
Following the Pin Point strategy, 53 Justice Thomas used every opportunity in the hearings to remind the senators about his impoverished youth, his grandfather's heroic nurturing, and the love and
care he received from the nuns at the Catholic schools he had attended, rather than his professional accomplishments. 54 Justice
Thomas tried to have it both ways; claiming that most of his professional record was not relevant to his judicial performance but that
he was otherwise uniquely qualified to become an associate justice.
The same man, who dared the senators to base their confirmation
decisions on the merits of his appointment rather than his race, constantly avoided claiming that his professional record reflected anything pertinent to the consideration of his nomination. Justice
Thomas implied that he would be an "empty vessel" who would decide cases strictly as the law dictated, but who would still somehow
be influenced in a positive way by his unique upbringing. 55
50. Ruth Marcus, Thomas Affirms Right to Privacy, WAsH. PosT, Sept. 11, 1991, at A1;
Higginbotham, supra note 49, at 1018 ("I submit that even your distinguished undergraduate college, Holy Cross, and Yale University were influenced by the milieu created
by [Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),] and thus became more sensitive
to the need to create programs for the recruitment of competent minority students. In
short, isn't it possible that you might not have gone to Holy Cross if the NAACP and
other civil rights organizations, Martin Luther King and the Supreme Court, had not
recast the racial mores of America? And if you had not gone to Holy Cross, and instead
had gone to some underfunded state college for Negroes in Georgia, would you have ...
met the alumni who have played such a prominent role in maximizing your professional
options?").
51. Neil A. Lewis, Thomas'joumey on Path of Self-Help, N.Y. TIMES, july 7, 1991, at
A12.
52. See David A. Kaplan, Supreme Mystery, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16, 1991, at 18, 30.
53. See supra note 7.
54. See, e.g., The Thomas Hearings: Excerpt from Senate Session on the Thomas Nomination,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at A22.
55. Richard L. Berke, Thomas Vote Delayed Until Tuesday, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1991, at
A20 (quoting Senator Paul Wellstone); Tom Wicker, A Court of Mediocrity, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1991, § 4, at 17 (quoting same).
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Given the Pin Point strategy56 in Phase I, Justice Thomas appeared to be either lying or woefully uninformed. It stretched credulity for Justice Thomas to claim that he never seriously discussed
Roe v. Wade 57 with anyone during or after law school,5 8 even though
Roe was one of the most important constitutional law cases decided
by the Court in the past twenty-five years and he had criticized it
more than once in his public statements and writings. 59 Justice
Thomas further stretched credulity when he claimed that he signed,
but never read, at least one government report deriding Roe, that he
never read a criticism of Roe that he had publicly praised, and that
he had no personal opinion regarding Roe despite his public condemnations of the controversial case. 60 Even if it were possible that
Justice Thomas had not read these documents before being nominated, it is astonishing that he did not read them in preparation for
the hearings when he must or should have known he would be questioned about them.
In addition, it stretched credulity for Justice Thomas to protest
repeatedly in Phase I of the proceedings that his controversial
speeches and articles-often critiquing liberal policies and Court
rulings-had not expressed any personal opinions he held or would
hold as a justice with respect to judicial decisionmaking. For example, he testified that he did not "see a role for the use of natural law
in constitutional adjudication" and that his "interest in exploring
natural law ... was purely in the context of political theory." 61 Yet
his writings consistently reflect a belief that natural law is a legitimate basis for judicial decisionmaking. 62 For example, in a 1989law
review article, then-EEOC Chairman Thomas wrote that:
without recourse to higher law, we abandon our best defense of
judicial review-a judiciary active in defending the Constitution,
but judicious in its restraint and moderation. Rather than being a
justification of the worst type ofjudicial activism, higher law is the
only alternative to the willfulness of both run-amok m~orities and
run-amok judges.63
56. See supra note 7.
57. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
58. See Neil A. Lewis, At the Bar: The Press Is Caught in a Misrepresentation of Clarence
ThoTIUIS' Words, or Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1991, at B9 (summarizing and evaluating
Justice Thomas' testimony regarding Roe).
59. See, e.g., Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV.j.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 63, 63 n.2 (1989) [hereinafter Thomas, Higher Law Background]; Clarence Thomas, Why Black Conservatives Should
Look to Conservative Policies, Speech to Heritage Foundation Uune 18, 1987) [hereinafter Thomas, Why Black Conservatives].
60. See Lewis, supra note 58, Chemerinsky, supra note 36.
61. Confusion Rules over Natural Law: Rivals Find Ammunition in Theory, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 12, 1991, at 16.
62. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
63. Thomas, Higher Law Background, supra note 59, at 63-64.
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Yet another problematic-and perhaps deceptive-piece of testimony was Justice Thomas' statement regarding the Court's 5-4 decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 64 which upheld FCC
broadcast license issuing policies favoring racial and ethic minorities. When asked whether he agreed with Metro Broadcasting, Justice
Thomas testified, "I have had no basis as a judge to disagree with
it. " 65 Yet, within days, the Legal Times broke a story suggesting Justice Thomas was trying to protect his nomination by withholding
from publication an opinion he had just written in which he questioned the reach of Metro Broadcasting and struck down the FCC's
policy preference for women in broadcast licensing. 66 Justice
Thomas denied that he was withholding the opinion for political
reasons, 67 but he proceeded to release the opinion as reported
months after his confirmation. 68
Similarly, in yet another apparent contradiction, Justice Thomas
testified that he accepted a marital right of privacy but held no personal opinion about privacy cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 69
even though he had described the holding as a judicial "invention."70 If Justice Thomas were to be taken at his word, the question becomes how well suited for the Supreme Court is someone
who did not hesitate to take public positions on controversial issues
about which he never has read or studied seriously, showed questionable judgment regarding his preparation to defend his record in
the only public forum in which he could be held accountable, and
exhibited virtually no intellectual curiosity about the most dominant
subject area--constitutional law-with which he would be dealing
on the Court.
During Phase II of the hearings, 71 the image of Justice Thomas
that emerged was no more appealing than the one that had appeared in Phase I. His characterization of Phase II of the hearing as
64. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
65. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Beware the judicial Override, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1991, at A25.
66. See Neil A. Lewis, Appeals Court Ruling by Thomas Limits F. C. C. Affirmative Action,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1992, at AI.
67. /d.
68. On February 19, 1992,Justice Thomas, by special designation, returned to the
appellate court to release his opinion (joined by Judge James Buckley, over a strong
dissent by ChiefJudge Abner Mikva) in Lamprecht v. FCC, No. 88-1395, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1997 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 1992), striking down the FCC's policy giving preferential treatment to women in awarding broadcast licenses. In explaining that the policy
was unconstitutional because it denied equal protection of the law to white men, Justice
Thomas rejected Metro Broadcasting's expressed deference to congressional fact-finding
in support of its laws on the ground that "the Government had failed to show that its
sex-preference policy is substantially related to achieving diversity on the airwaves." !d.
at *30.
69. For Justice Thomas' testimony on Griswold, see, for example, Linda P. Campbell,
Thomas Supports a Right to Privacy; Reply Surprises Democrats; judge Won't Discuss Abortion,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. II, 1991, at AI.
70. Clarence Thomas, Civil Rights as a Principle Versus Civil Rights as an Interest, in AsSESSING THE REAGAN YEARS 398 (David Boaz ed., 1988).
71. See text preceding supra note 50.
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"a high-tech lynching for uppity blacks"72 was shockingly hypocritical for at least two reasons. First, Justice Thomas and his sponsor,
Senator John Danforth, had asked for the Phase II hearings. 73 Second, Justice Thomas spent much of his professional life criticizing
other African-Americans for blaming the ills that befell them on racism rather than their own shortcomings. 74 He even denounced his
sister by invoking the stereotype of a "welfare queen,"7 5 although
he had her sit behind him during his confirmation testimony.
If the nominee that appeared at the hearings was not the real
Clarence Thomas, but rather a caricature molded by his handlers,
then one can only wonder who is the real Clarence Thomas and
whether he is qualified to sit on the Court. Was it the real Clarence
Thomas who, in a 1987 speech, praised Lewis Lehrman's pro-life
oriented critique of Roe v. Wade as "a splendid example" of the application of natural law to judicial decisionmaking; 76 or was it the
real Clarence Thomas who testified in 1987 that he only "skimmed"
the Lehrman article? 77 Was it the real Clarence Thomas who testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that he was qualified to
sit on the Supreme Court because he had the compassion to ponder
"but for the grace of God[,] there go I" whenever he saw a busload
of prisoners coming to the District of Columbia Courthouse? 78 Or
was it the real Clarence Thomas who, in one of his first dissents,
sharply criticized the seven member majority for applying the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment to confinement conditions in general and to the gratuitous beating of a
black inmate? 79 Was it the real Clarence Thomas who testified·
72. The Thomas Nomination: Excerpts from Senate's Hearings on the Thomas Nomination,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1991, at A12.
73. See Chemerinsky, supra note 36.
74. See, e.g., Derrick Z.Jackson, Hardly a Lynch Victim, BosToN GLOBE, Oct. 16, 1991,
at 15. In the aftermath ofThomas' confirmation, these charges prompted an open letter
from Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., who was somewhat skeptical ofJustice Thomas
and other black conservatives. "Other than their own self-advancement, I am at a loss to
understand what it is that the so-called black conservatives are so anxious to conserve."
Higginbotham, supra note 49, at 1018.
75. Charles R. Lawrence III, Perspectives on the Thomas Controversy, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
15, 1991, at B7; see also Murray Kempton, What About the Children, Senators?, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 18, 1991, at 13 (referring to Justice Thomas, then-EEOC chairman, as having
"trash[ed] his nephews as welfare addicts"); Neil A. Lewis, Thomas'journey on Path of SelfHelp, N.Y. TIMEs, July 7, 1991, at A12 (quoting Justice Thomas, then EEOC Chairman,
as saying his sister "gets mad when the mailman is late with the check").
76. Thomas, Why Black Conservatives, supra note 59, at 8.
77. Ruth Marcus, Thomas Rifuses to State View on Abortion Issue: Nominee Steadfast amid
Senators' Questions, WAsH. PosT, Sept. 12, 1991, at A1, A4.
78. Excerpts from Senate's Hearings on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
·
1991, at A18.
79. Joined only by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas argued that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment did not protect prisoners from beatings by
guards unless the prisoners suffered serious injuries. Justice Thomas scolded the majority, including ChiefJustice Rehnquist, for adhering to precedents which "cut the Eighth
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under oath, that he had no judicial ideology hostile to liberal judicial
decisionmaking-regardless of any public statements to the contrary-but who has voted differently fromJustice Scalia, the Court's
most strident conservative ideologue, only twice thus far. 8 ° First, as
the sole dissenter in Dawson v. Delaware, Justice Thomas caustically
attacked Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion ruling that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit, in the capital sentencing phase of a murder trial, the introduction of evidence of a defendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood which began after
the defendant had become a prisoner for the crime for which he was
being sentenced. 81 The second divergence occurred "when Oustice] Scalia issued a three sentence concurrence in a minor case involving federal [civil] procedure."S2
Ultimately, the irony of Justice Thomas' career may be that, despite his lifelong protestations to the contrary, he may be
remembered primarily for his work in civil rights. Indeed, he has
done little, if any, memorable work in any other area. Justice
Thomas has reached a point at which it would be futile to protest
further against being associated closely with the one area of the law
that he claimed he sought to avoid. 83 The question now facing him
is: In rising above his impoverished background, how much of it did
Justice Thomas leave behind? We can only wonder in what ways he
will use his race, his impoverished background, the lessons his
grandfather taught him, and the discrimination he often has facedAmendment loose from its historical moorings" by applying it to both punishment and
confinement conditions. See Hudson v. McMillian, 60 U.S.L.W. 4151, 4155, 4157 (U.S.
Feb. 25, 1992) (Thomas,]., dissenting); see alro David Margolick, Atthe Bar: From a Lonely
Prison Cell, an Inmate Wins an Important Victory for Civil Liberties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1992,
at B8 (describing how a prison guard, after using racially abusive language, beat Hudson
for washing his laundry in his cell toilet). In another of his first votes, Justice Thomas
joined Chiefjustice Rehnquist and justice Scalia in dissenting from the Court's decision
to override justice Scalia's ruling as a Circuit Justice to reverse an order staying an execution. See Collins v. May, 112 S. Ct. 576 (1991).
80. See L. Gordon Crovitz,justice Thomas['s] opinion: No Wonder They Wanted to Stop
Him, WALL ST.j.,Jan. 29, 1992, at A13 (indicating ':Justice Thomas has voted with justice Scalia more than any other Justice" and suggesting that ':Justice Thomas already has
done more than solidify the intellectual conservative wing of the Court. It also seems
likely that his lifelong career on the Supreme Court will be a constant reminder to his
critics of why they went to such lengths to try to block his nomination"); Ruth Marcus,
Early Returns Show justice Thomas as Advertised: Conservative, WASH. PosT, Mar. I, 1992, at
A6; see alro Linda Greenhouse, judicious Activism: justice Thomas Hits the Ground Running,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. I, 1992, § 4, at I (criticizing Justice Thomas for his "willingness to
discard precedents in which the Court departed from the search for the original understanding," for chiding the majority in Hudson "for endorsing 'the pervasive view that the
Federal Constitution must address all ills of our society,' " and for using a tone in his
opinions "reminiscent of the speeches in which [he] used to criticize the Court when he
served as one of the Reagan Administration's chief emissaries to conservatives interested in reshaping the Federal judiciary. At his confirmation hearing, he said he had
made the speeches as a 'part-time political theorist,' but that when he became a Federal
judge [he] had 'shed the baggage of ideology' ").
81. Dawson v. Delaware, 60 U.S.L.W. 4197,4201 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1992) (Thomas,J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that majority's "[d]enying that [the defendant's] gang membership told the jury anything about his activities, tendencies, and traits-his 'character'ignores reality").
82. Marcus, supra note 80.
83. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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all of which he presented as the only basis on which the Senate
should confirm him84-to become an effective spokesperson on the
Supreme Court in dealing with the civil rights issues that surely will
come his way. In short, will Justice Thomas tell the same stories on
the Court that he told in his confirmation hearings, and will a more
formidable, coherent, uplifting and lasting vision of constitutional
law ever emerge from the beneficiary of the Pin Point Strategy?
C.

The Senate: "You Take the High Road, and I'll Take the Low Road"

To appreciate the effectiveness of the Pin Point strategy, 85 it is
important to analyze separately the performance of the Democratic
and Republican senators in each phase of the confirmation hearings.86 Despite beginning somewhat cautiously in Phase I with their
criticism, the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee-with
the exception of Senator DeConcini-eventually took Justice
Thomas to task for his evasive testimony, surprisingly weak grasp of
constitutional law, and dubious credentials. For example, Senator
Metzenbaum opposed Justice Thomas based on the latter's controversial record as Chairman of the EEOC, unbelievable testimony
before the Judiciary Committee, and inadequate "legal credentials"
to serve on the Court;87 Senator Leahy opposed Justice Thomas because the nominee lacked "the experience and qualifications that a
Supreme Court Justice ought to have"; 88 Senator Kohl opposedJustice Thomas for his "selective recall," "lack oflegal curiosity," and
"limited legal knowledge"; 89 and Senator Heflin voted against Justice Thomas' confirmation because Justice Thomas lacked credibility and competency. 90 Nevertheless, Justice Thomas' evasive
answers and expressions of ignorance91 had little negative impact
on the Senate's portended vote at the conclusion of Phase 1.92
In addition, Justice Thomas' performance in Phase I often seemed
to hinder the senators from pursuing a more elevated discussion
with him regarding constitutional law and his intellectual fitness to
84. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 7.
86. Professor Chemerinsky notes that the Pin Point Strategy worked particularly
we11 with a number of the southern Democrats, who approved ofjustice Thomas' views
on affirmative action and were keenly aware that much of their support came from African-Americans, who tended to support Thomas. See Chemerinsky, supra note 36.
87. See The Thomas Nomination: Excerpts from Remarks by Members of Senate judicial Panel
on Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991, § 1, at 8.
88. /d.
89. See id.
90. See Richard L. Berke, Two Democrats on Senate Panel Say They Will Oppose Thomas,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1991, at Al.
91. See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, The Thomas Hearings; Thomas to Jl'in Court Seat, Senators
Predict, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1991, § 1, at 1.
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serve on the Court, often deflecting or obstructing more intensive
interrogation. First, in response to questioning from Senator
Leahy, Justice Thomas stated he did not debate Roe v. Wade as a law
student because he was married and working at the time, and "did
not spend a lot of time around the law school doing what all the
other students enjoyed so much, and that is debating all the current
cases." 93 Yet Newsweek reported that, as a student, Justice Thomas
usually "spent the entire day at [law] school, not going home until
after midnight." 94 Justice Thomas again evaded an attempt to engage him in a discussion of constitutional law when he later testified,
in the midst of questioning from Senator Leahy, that he did not believe there were any cases holding that fetuses are not persons entitled to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. 95 The
obvious answer was Roe, which held that fetuses are not "persons"
for constitutional purposes. 96 Afraid of appearing to badger the
witness, senators did not use Justice Thomas' ignorance about the
elementary holding of a case, which even he acknowledged as being
one of the most important constitutional law cases decided in this
century, 97 to stress that Justice Thomas lacked the intellectual distinction or fitness to serve on the Court.98
Second, Justice Thomas' testimony that he thought the Supreme
Court upheld a private employer's policy barring pregnant women
from working on jobs that might harm their fetuses was equally
damning. 99 In fact, the Court struck downjust such a policy as violating federal employment discrimination laws (Title VII) in International Union, U.A. W. v. johnson Controls. 100 johnson Controls was one of
the most important Title VII decisions last term and was withinJustice Thomas' supposed area of specialization; yet his misstatement
of its holding appeared to become lost in the midst of his many evasive and incredible statements under oath.
Third, in response to the controversial question of what criterion
Justice Thomas would use for determining whether to overrule a
constitutional precedent, he approved the standard announced in
Justice Thurgood Marshall's final dissent, 101 which suggested the
Court should have "strong reasons" for overruling a prior decision.102 Justice Thomas testified further that the Court's standard
93. Marcus, supra note 77, at A4.
94. David A. Kaplan et al., Supreme Mystery, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16, 1991, at 18, 26.
95. See Neil A. Lewis, Thomas Undergoes Tough Questioning on Past Remarks, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 1991, at A1, A21.
96. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
97. See Anna Quindlen, Trying to Fill In Clarence Thomas' Newly Blank Slate, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 17, 1991, at 19 (quoting justice Thomas as testifying, "I cannot think of any cases
that have held [that fetuses are not persons for Constitutional purposes]").
98. Cf Neil A. Lewis, High Court Nominee's Testimony Continues to Frustrate Democrats,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, at Al.
99. See Neil A. Lewis, Thomas Ends Testimony but Senators Grumble over Elusive Views,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at A14.
100. I 11 S. Ct. I 196 (1991).
101. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597,2619 (1991) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
102. Lewis, supra note 99.
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for overruling precedents "should be as uniform as possible" 103 and
that he believed "the cases in the individual rights area deserve the
greatest protection." 104
Yet no senator probed the accuracy, sincerity, or implications of
Justice Thomas' answers. For instance, he slightly misstated Justice
Marshall's view on stare decisis, which would have required that the
Court overrule precedents only if those decisions were decided
wrongly and would lead to other serious problems if followed. 105
Nor did any senator ask Justice Thomas to explain what he would
accept as "strong reasons" for overruling precedent. In addition, it
would have been possible to assess Justice Thomas' position on precedent by asking Justice Thomas to cite and distinguish between
cases he felt should be overruled and those he felt should not.
Fourth, when Justice Thomas testified that the only opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut 106 with which he agreed was Justice Harlan's
concurrence, the same stance taken by Justices Kennedy and Souter,107 no one pressed Justice Thomas on why he preferredJustice
Harlan's concurrence over Justice White's concurrence or Justice
Douglas' majority opinion. 10S Given the general admiration many
senators and scholars have for Justice Harlan's jurisprudence in
general, and his Griswold concurrence in particular, Justice Thomas'
professed agreement with the latter was such welcome news to the
Democratic senators on the Judiciary Committee that it seems to
have misled them into thinking Justice Thomas may have more in
common with Justice Harlan than is the case.
103. Marcus, supra note 77, at A4.
104. Id. It did not take Justice Thomas long, however, to renege on this statement.
Within his first four months on the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas called for the reconsideration and overruling of the Court's well established precedents on the Confrontation Clause and the Eighth Amendment. See supra note 79; White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct.
736, 744, 746 (1992) (Thomas,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that the Court should have reexamined the Court's Confrontation Clause
precedents because "[t]he standards that the Court has developed to implement its assumption that the Confrontation Clause limits admission of hearsay evidence have no
basis in the text of the Sixth Amendment" and that he "wr[o]te separately only to suggest that our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has evolved in a manner that is perhaps inconsistent with the text and history of the clause itself").
105. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2621-22. See generally Gerhardt, Role of Precedent, supra note
10, at 120-21.
106. 381 u.s. 479 (1965).
107. See Campbell, supra note 69. Justice Thomas' endorsement of Griswold "was almost identical to statements given a year ago by David Souter." /d.
108. The honest answer would probably have been that Justice Harlan did not live
long enough to sit on the Court during Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and that
Justice Douglas' concurrence and Justice White's dissent in Roe were not positions with
which Justice Thomas wanted to associate himself. Other issues many senators failed to
probe during the hearing included Justice Thomas' tenure as EEOC chairman, see
Chemerinsky, supra note 36, and Justice Thomas' endorsement of Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), which has
racist elements.
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Phase I presented the Democrats with numerous other problems.
Justice Thomas repeatedly asked the Committee, in effect, to confirm him on the basis of his character and achievements while claiming that his professional record said nothing about how he would
perform as ajustice. 109 IfJustice Thomas was to have been taken at
his word, then it is not clear on what basis the administration wanted
him as a Supreme Court justice or could have claimed him as the
"best person" for thejob. 110 IfJustice Thomas' professional record
were indicative of how he would perform on the Supreme Court,
then the Committee should not have hesitated to reach conclusions
about his record, with or without Justice Thomas' assistance.
In addition, the Democrats in Phase I did not fully address Senator Hatch's charge that, particularly with respect to abortion, they
were holding Justice Thomas to a far tougher standard than the one
to which they had heldJustice Souter. 111 The Democrats could have
clarified their strategy and Justice Thomas' own dubious performance in the hearings by arguing that Justice Thomas merited different treatment because, unlike Justice Souter, Justice Thomas had
publicly criticized Roe and, therefore, his testimony distancing himself from that criticism merited close scrutiny. In addition, Justice
Thomas' testimony was far more evasive than Justice Souter's,
which displayed a vastly greater degree of familiarity with the nuances of constitutional law and judicial decisionmaking. 112 Moreover, unlike Justice Souter, Justice Thomas relied on his character as
the primary basis for confirmation. Thus, the Democrats had license to probe his character, intellectual abilities, and integrity, particularly about an issue as important as abortion.
Neither the Democrats nor Republicans fully addressed the statements from various witnesses that the hardships Justice Thomas
overcame in his youth could not forecast his performance as a
judge. 11 3 More than one witness' testimony suggested thatJustice
Thomas' background did not necessarily make him a better person
or judge, or reflect anything probative about his current attitudes
toward various segments of society, judicial authority, or federalism; 114 yet this testimony went unaddressed.
109. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
110. Supra note 34 and accompanying text.
Ill. See Neil A. Lewis, High Court Nominee's Testimony Continues to Frustrate Democrats,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, at AI.
112. See, e.g., Baier, supra note 24.
113. See Excerpts from Hearing on Thomas' Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1991, at
A16.
114. See, e.g., id. (testimony of Professor Patricia King of the Georgetown University
Law Center). Professor King testified, "I don't think Judge Thomas' background is any
more a predictor of his future service on any bench than mine has been for my career [as
a law professor] .... Somehow, Judge Thomas seems not to remember those he must
have encountered along the way who were lost to the darkness simply because there was
no help for them." /d. Harvard Professor Chris Edley, Jr., another prominent AfricanAmerican legal scholar, also testified that character alone does not necessarily make
someone a good justice. /d.
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In Phase II,Justice Thomas' charges ofracism 115 cowed the Democrats into not pressing him on several matters relevant to the illumination of his character and Professor Hill's credibility. None of
the Democrats responded to Justice Thomas' charge that Professor
Hill's allegations were the product of a racist conspiracy. 116 The
senators neglected to answer Justice Thomas' charge that Phase II
was racist by reminding him that the investigation undertaken in
Phase II was pursuant to a request made by Justice Thomas and
Senator Danforth. 117 Nor did anyone press Justice Thomas to identify the racists responsible for the probe-which he had requestedor to prove the existence of the racist conspiracy against him, including how it could have started ten years earlier when Professor
Anita Hill first told a friend about being sexually harassed by
Thomas. 118
Moreover, the Chairman of the Committee, Senator Biden, may
not have clarified sufficiently the most difficult question in Phase II.
Senator Biden conducted Phase II as if the burden of proof were on
Justice Thomas' accusers. If the only issue in Phase II were the
truth of Professor Hill's allegations, then this position was absolutely correct: Justice Thomas was entitled to a presumption of innocence regarding any specific allegations of misbehavior in the
office. Otherwise, any nomination could be thwarted by anyone
coming forward with false accusations. But if the issue in Phase II
was Justice Thomas' fitness to serve on the Court, then the burden
of proof remained onJustice Thomas, particularly because his character was already put into question by much of his earlier evasive
and incredible testimony. 119 In other words, the debate over the
truth of Professor Hill's allegations should not have clouded the issue whether Justice Thomas had established generally the kind of
character and professional fitness to merit confirmation to the
Court. 120
115. See supra text accompanying note 72.
116. See, e.g., Steve Daley & Mitchell Locin, Day of Reckoning/or Thomas; Democrats from
South May Hold Key, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 15, 1991, at AI (referring to Justice Thomas' remark that he was a "victim" of a racist conspiracy).
117. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
118. See The Thomas Nomination: Statements to Senators from Witnesses for Anita Hit~ N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at AI.
119. See supra notes 53-82 and accompanying text.
120. In addition, Senator Biden may have given in too easily to the Administration's
requests to allow Justice Thomas to testify during prime time and to forego personal
questions about his conduct outside of the office. See Helen Dewar, Democrats Criticizedfor
Strategy on Thomas: Approach in Hearings Called Too Cautious, WASH. PosT, Oct. 20, 1991, at
All. Senator Biden's acquiescence in these requests allowed the Committee only a partial view ofJustice Thomas' character, yet his character was the only real basis on which
Justice Thomas was allowing the Senate to evaluate him. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. Regrettably, questioning was either discouraged, or simply not allowed, with respect to (1) the dissolution of Justice Thomas' first marriage, which
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For their part, the Republicans in Phase !-with the exceptions of
Senators Grassley and Brown-appeared to be apologists for Justice
Thomas, overlooking his many foibles in the hopes of attracting
more African-Americans to their party and of his being the kind of
ideologue they would like to see on the Court. They generally failed
to question the Bush administration's faith in the nominee's qualifications and ideology and avoided pressing him on any substantive
matters or on his lack of judicial experience.
During Phase II, Senators Hatch, Simpson, and Specter seemed
to twist facts, mischaracterize Professor Hill's testimony, give
credence-without proof-to the most outlandish theories on why
she was lying before the Committee, and assume without serious
inquiry that Justice Thomas had an exemplary character and was
credible. None of the three senators allowed the facts to get in the
way of their mission to discredit Professor Hill. Senator Simpson
referred cryptically to information "coming in over the transom"; 121
Senator Specter triumphantly declared that Professor Hill "committed perjury" even though there was no credible evidence to support
the claim (and he later recanted); 122 and Senator Hatch sanctimoniously suggested that anyone who acts the way Professor Hill described Justice Thomas as acting could not be a "normal person,"
but rather a "psychopathic sex fiend or a pervert"-in contrast to
Justice Thomas' presumably always-professional conduct. 123 Senator Hatch even suggested that Hill must have lifted parts of her testimony from the horror novel, The Exorcist, 1 2 4 and an opinion from
the Tenth Circuit, in which Professor Hilllives. 125
The Democrats and Republicans together must share the blame
for not taking seriously Professor Hill's-and other women'sclaims of sexual harassment by Justice Thomas. Once the Federal
seemed painfully relevant to his state of mind at the time of the alleged harassment, (2)
Justice Thomas' behavior outside the office, and (3) whether Professor Hill's allegations
could have been prompted by her personal dislike for, or philosophical disagreements
with, Justice Thomas.
121. Against Clarence Thomas: Even 'Don't Know' Calls for a 'No' Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 1991, at A24.
122. Id.
123. Walter V. Robinson, Thomas Says He'll Fight to the End: Supporters Rip into Sex Allegations, BosTON GLOBE, Oct. 13, 1991, at I. This line of questioning may have had its
desired effect in that it put the burden on the senators who disbelieved Justice Thomas
to show that he had a pattern or practice of engaging in the type of behavior alleged by
Professor Hill. Although making this showing would have been relevant-but not dispositive-in a 1991lawsuit brought against Justice Thomas for sexual harassment, it was
irrelevant to a simple claim that his behavior was tasteless, degrading to women, and
unprofessional, if not illegal. As the administration's top official responsible for redressing sexual harassment claims, Justice Thomas should have been held to a higher
standard of performance in the office than just whether his conduct was legal. Moreover, this kind of questioning by Senator Hatch was just one dramatic example of why
each side should have designated a special counsel to ask their respective questions.
The problem was that the senators apparently were not familiar with changes in sexual
harassment law or inadequately identified the relevant factors for determining the credibility of the witnesses in Phase II.
124. Michael Hedges, Hatch Finds Curious Precedents for Hill's Allegations, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 1991, at A18.
125. See id. (referring to Carter v. Sedgwick County, 705 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Kan.
1988)).
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Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Report indicated that it was a swearing match between Justice Thomas and Professor Hill as to whether
he sexually harassed her, no one in a position of authority on the
Committee seemed to want to go forward, even to hold closed hearings. In fact, many senators, including Senator Hatch, did not even
read the FBI report when it first came out. 126 Closed hearings
would have fulfilled the Senate's duty to take the charges seriously
and to assess the only thing Justice Thomas ever willingly put into
issue during the hearings-his character. At the very least, the FBI
could have been asked to extend its investigation to probe into Professor Hill's motivations for lying, Justice Thomas' general conduct
in the office, and other allegations of sexual harassment directed at
Justice Thomas.
Moreover, most of the senators did not separate legal claims of
sexual harassment from mere allegations of improper sexual conduct. The Republicans asking questions in Phase II tried to suggest
either that Professor Hill must have been lying because she did not
seek legal redress at the time Justice Thomas allegedly sexually
harassed her, or that her claims did not rise to the level of being
legally cognizable. The Senate failed to recognize that our general
sensitivity and understanding of sexual harassment is far different
today than it was in the early 1980s, and that Professor Hill did not
have available at the time of the alleged harassment the same kind
or range of legal remedies a woman would have now. 127 Nor did
any of the senators on the Committee focus on the impropriety of
Justice Thomas' conduct as opposed to its illegality, a particularly
apt focus given that Justice Thomas relied solely on his character for
confirmation. In addition, in the event that any of the senators believed Professor Hill's allegations, not one of them pointed out that
Justice Thomas' outright denials under oath constituted perjury.

Ill.

Politics and the Court in the 1990s: Back to the Future

If the system for nominating and confirming Supreme Court justices does not require constitutional amendment, the question remains how the President, the Senate, and the public can ensure the
elevation of political discourse on, and the criteria for, evaluating
Supreme Court justices. The answer turns largely on making minor
adjustments to the nomination and confirmation proceedings to
126. See Timothy M. Phelps & Gaylord Shaw, The 2nd Woman: New Witness Against
Thomas Was Fired from EEOC, NEWSDAY, Oct. 11, 1991, at 5.
127. For example, at the time of the alleged harassment, Professor Hill would not
have had any claim under Title VII. However, assuming arguendo there would have
been no statute of limitations problem, she could have conceivably brought a Title VII
action against justice Thomas at the time of the hearings for back pay and reinstatement.
See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 (1986).
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make it easier for the public to participate more fully in the process,
and for the President and the Senate to undertake nobler and more
accountable judgments regarding the selection of Supreme Court
justices. These changes may be particularly effective in aiding the
divided state of our government to allow its institutions to function
optimally in the nomination and confirmation process.
One solution is for members of the public to become more involved in the nomination and confirmation process. If the public
and its representatives in the Senate do not share the President's
views on the criteria to be used in evaluating and choosing federal
judges in general and Supreme Courtjustices in particular, then the
public and the Senate should demand that the President prove his
appointments are in the best interests of the American people, the
Court, and the Constitution, and hold him politically accountable
when they are not.
The Senate, and particularly the Judiciary Committee, could also
do more to influence the selection offederaljudges. First, the Judiciary Committee could follow the example established by President
Hoover's selection ofJustice Cardozo and refuse to confirm anyone
unless the person is of the Committee's own choosing. 128 Of
course, the effectiveness of this proposal depends on the Senate's
ability to stand its ground in the face of presidential opposition.
Second, the Senate and, in particular, the Judiciary Committee
should not refrain from explicitly endorsing nominees on the basis
of their credibility, judicial temperament and philosophy, and professional experience. In other words, the Senate should reach some
consensus on the credentials it would like for judicial nominees to
possess, and then adhere to that consensus in spite of presidential
opposition. For example, the majority on the Judiciary Committee
could announce at the outset of confirmation proceedings that they
will not vote for any nominees who give evasive answers to questions about their public records, fail to affirm expressly certain fundamental liberties or freedoms that members of the Committee
would like to see endorsed, or fail to demonstrate a level of professional accomplishment that the members of the Committee want to
see in a federal judge including a Supreme Court justice. If the
President were to nominate to the bench ideologues with little
meaningful experience in the law and the craftsmanship of judging,
then the Senate could exercise its political judgment to demand a
nominee with more substantial and meaningful professional
experience.
Third, the Committee could spend less time interrogating the
nominee and more time examining the nominee's public record and
questioning people who are familiar with that record. For example,
the Committee could make clear at the outset of its proceedings that
it will place more importance on how a cross-section of the legal
community perceives the nominee's qualifications to become a
128. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.

992

(VOL.

60:969

Divided justice
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Supreme Court justice than on the nominee's testimony. In addition, in questioning people who know the nominee, the Committee
could be more aggressive in uncovering stances on constitutional
issues that the nominee may have communicated privately. 129
Fourth, the Senate should reach some consensus on the burden of
persuasion in confirmation proceedings. In this regard, the Senate
could follow the lead of Senators Gore and Simon, both of whom
argued that the burden of persuasion in a confirmation battle
should rest with the nominee. 130 In the final debate on the Thomas
nomination on the floor of the Senate, they both took the position
that the burden of persuasion was on the President, the nominee, or
both, to show that Justice Thomas merited a seat on the Court. For
example, Senator Simon pointed out that "the benefit of the doubt"
regarding a Supreme Court nominee should be resolved in favor of
"the people of this country" and the Constitution. 131 Both senators
maintained in effect that the Senate's ultimate fidelity should have
been to the future generations of Americans who would have to live
under Justice Thomas' rulings. In short, their position was that because Justice Thomas was asking the Committee to give him life tenure with which to become a final interpreter of the Constitution, the
Senate should not have entrusted the Constitution to him unless it
was fully comfortable with doing so.
Finally, the Judiciary Committee should reconsider its scheduling
of confirmation hearings. The Committee delays hearings to allow
for investigation of the nominee, but the delay enables the administration to fully coach or indoctrinate a nominee in the law. Any delay actually threatens judicial independence because it increases the
degree to which the administration can influence the judicial philosophy of a nominee. In addition, the nominee may feel inclined to
favor the administration based on his ideological indoctrination and
the assistance he receives-particularly during heated hearings-to
achieve confirmation.
Instead, the Committee could schedule hearings shortly after the
President announces his choice for the Court and focus the hearings
primarily on the public record of the nominee. If the Committee
were to choose to hear from the nominee, its more rapid scheduling
129. For example, the Committee could cross-examine a nominee as to whether he
spoke to anyone about his prospective nomination or testimony and, if so, to whom did
he speak, when did the conversation(s) take place, what was said, and why did the conversation occur.
130. See Senate Debate on the Nomination ofjudge Thomas, Federal News Service, Oct. 15,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (remarks of Senator Simon) [hereinafter Simons
Remarks], Senate Debate on the Nomination ofJudge Thomas, Federal News Service, Oct. 8,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (remarks of Senator Gore).
131. See Simons Remarks, supra note 130.
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could force the nominee to rely more on his own resources. In addition, the Committee could limit the nominee's testimony to specific
responses to particular attacks on his record or specific arguments
regarding why he should be confirmed. Or the Senate might even
consider returning to its pre-1925 practice of simply evaluating
nominees on the basis of their public records rather than their testimony before the Committee.I 32 The earlier practice never precluded substantial give-and-take between the President and the
Senate whenever they each felt inclined to become involved seriously in nomination and confirmation decisions.I 33

Conclusion
In the twenty-four years between Justice Marshall's and Justice
Thomas' confirmation hearings, this nation traveled from being divided over fear, hatred, and hope in having a distinguished AfricanAmerican on the Supreme Court to feeling guilty, confused, and angry about the place of race, racism, and sexism in the nomination
and confirmation of Supreme Court justices. IfJustice Frankfurter's
observation was correct that constitutional law is "applied politics,
using the word in its noblest sense,"I34 then it is hard to find the
nobility in the aftermath ofJustice Thomas' nomination and confirmation. Indeed, Justice Thomas' performance thus far as an associate justice exposes his evasive, and oftentimes seriously misleading,
testimony in his confirmation hearings and the Senate's negligence
in allowing him to get away with such testimony.I3 5
Nevertheless, we can still recapture some nobility with two remembrances. First, we should recall those moments in the history
of the nomination and confirmation process when the President and
the Senate pushed each other to consider seriously the best interests
of the nation, the Court, and the Constitution in selecting and evaluating Supreme Court nominees. Moreover, the framers envisioned
the Senate as the body best suited to deliberate carefully on the
great political issues of the day, I36 of which Justice Thomas' confirmation was clearly one.
132. Indeed, the practice of allowing nominees to testify before a committee did not
become firmly entrenched until about 1955, and only since 1959-with the hearings on
Justice Potter Stewart's nomination-did it become customary for the Senate to inquire
in any detail about a nominee's views on cases or legal philosophy. See ABRAHAM, supra
note 11, at 251-95.
133. If the Committee were to adopt this proposal-something I admit is highly unlikely-it would then be incumbent upon the Senate to stop nominees from paying private "courtesy calls" on each senator. Otherwise, the nominees could easily undermine
the rationale behind the proposal by making private assurances to various senators. If,
however, the Committee barred nominees from testifying in confirmation hearings but
the Senate permitted private "courtesy calls" with each senator, then the Committee
should ensure that any information about the nominee's judicial ideology which was
shared privately with any senator is aired publicly.
134. Alexander M. Bickel, Applied Politics and the Science of Law: Writings of the Harvard
Period, in FELIX FRANKFURTER: A TRIBUTE 164, 166 (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964).
135. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
136. See PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at
106 (1984).
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Second, we could all do well to remember the example Justice
Marshall set throughout a lifetime dedicated to racial justice. No
lawyer or judge ever spoke more eloquently, powerfully, forthrightly, or tirelessly for the powerless, disenfranchised, and dispossessed among us. Justice Marshall remains the only Supreme Court
justice who devoted most of his professional life to helping the underprivileged, who had the courage to criticize relentlessly from the
bench and elsewhere the public and private sectors for their failures
in achieving racial equality, and who-like Justice Thomas-had suffered the sting of racism throughout his life. Justice Marshall's life
reminds us thatJustice Thomas is not the first person to be able to
tell the kinds of stories he told to the Judiciary Committee. Justice
Marshall's career, ranging from a brilliant and courageous publicinterest lawyer for over two decades, to a federal court of appeals
judge, to United States Solicitor General, reminds us of the level of
professional distinction we can demand from and get in our
Supreme Court justices.I37
However, Justice Marshall had no monopoly on principle, and
Justice Thomas has every right in the world to chart his own judicial
course. Justice Marshall emphasized that the federal courts exist in
large part to protect individual liberties from being infringed by the
government, at all levels, or by private conduct that is encouraged
or fostered by hostile or callously indifferent states. Iss He persistently admonished that we, as a nation, have a long way to travel
before we can end racial discrimination and injustice, and that the
Court has an indispensable role to perform in helping us reach that
elusive destination. 139 In contrast to Justice Marshall, Justice
Thomas rejects "the pervasive view that the Federal Constitution
must address all ills in our society." 140 Justice Thomas seems to
take the position that a function of the federal courts, at least as
important as the one advanced by Justice Marshall, is to protect
from federal or private interference the structural and policymaking
autonomy of the states regarding a wide range of important
interests.
Yet, Justice Thomas has not shown how his constitutional vision,
including his apparently deep-seated distrust of the federal government and courts and trust in state governments, will leave the field
137. For discussion of Justice Marshall's career and jurisprudence, see A Tribute to
justice Thurgood Marshal~ 105 HARV. L. REV. 23-76 (1991) (including commentaries by
William]. Brennan, Jr., Robert L. Carter, William T. Coleman, Jr., Owen Fiss, A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr., and Martha Minow).
138. See William]. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 23-32 (1991).
139. ld.
140. Hudson v. McMillian, 60 U.S.L.W. 4151, 4155, 4158 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1992)
(Thomas,]., dissenting).
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of civil rights better off than he found it. Nor has he shown how his
vision will be more effective than Justice Marshall's competing approach to heal racial divisions and injustice. In addition, Justice
Thomas has not demonstrated why, particularly with respect to the
maintenance of the conditions characterizing Justice Thomas' an~
many other Americans' childhoods, the states deserve the kind of
widespread deference he apparently wants to give them. Consequently, we should not forget that although a divided justice of the
sort Justice Thomas appears content to perpetuate is better than no
justice at all, it is still not the kind ofjustice or as much justice as we
need.
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